FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN by Matsui, Shigenori
Osaka University
Title FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN
Author(s)Matsui, Shigenori
CitationOsaka University Law Review. 38 P.13-P.42
Issue Date1991-02
Text Versionpublisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/8543
DOI
Rights
        FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN JAPAN* 
                        Shigenori Matsui** 
                  INTRODUCTION
  Freedom of expression isgenerally recognized as the bulwark of all other freedoms 
and thus as the essential constituent of democracy. If one examines to what extent 
freedom of expression is protected, therefore, one would justifiably be able to assess 
to what extent democracy isactually working in that country. Then what about Japan? 
Is freedom of expression sufficiently protected in Japan? 
  The Japanese Constitution of 1946 in its Art. 21 provides: 
     Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press, and all 
     other forms of expression are guaranteed. 
     No censorship shall be maintained... 
Freedom of expression is thus constitutionally guaranteed in Japan. 
  This freedom was already protected under the Meiji Constitution of 1889, the first 
modern Constitution in Japan. But it was only a benevolent grant from the Emperor 
to his subjects and its protection had to yield to any restrictions imposed by the statutes. 
Thus freedom of expression was subject o various restrictions under such Acts as the 
Public Peace Preservation Act, Newspapers Act, or Publications Act. And it was 
severely oppressed before and during the World War II. Socialist or communist 
expression was most rigorously curtailed from the beginning but soon all kinds of 
criticism against the Govemment came to be similarly curtailed. Especially during the 
wartime, there was no freedom to criticize the sacred war or even to refrain from 
actively supporting that war. Since there was no system of judicial review, there was 
no possibility of judicial relief either. 
  After the World War II, the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), believing that these restrictions an freedom of 
expression were greatly responsible for the emergence ofextreme militarism in Japan, 
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   was so determined that full protection of freedom of expression would be vital to future 
   development of democracy in this country. It thus ordered abolitions of all statutes 
   and regulations restricting these freedoms. And it even ordered immediate release of 
   those detained under these statutes when it found that the Japanese Governmenthad 
   no intent of such release. The protection accorded to freedom of expression by the 
  Japanese Constitution apparently reflects this history. 
     Everyone would agree, therefore, that freedom of expression is fully guaranteed in
   Japan at least an the text of the Constitution. But is it sufficiently protected also in its 
   actual Operation? 
     In order to answer this question, this paper will portray major issues concerning 
   freedom of expression in Japan.') And it will attempt to give at least a provisional 
   answer to that question. 
      1. THE GENERAL THEORY OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
   1-1. The Constitutional Guarantee 
     Even though Art. 21 separately ists freedom of assembly, association, speech and 
   press, there is no doubt that it purports to protect all forms of expression. And it is 
   also evident hat the Japanese Constitution which declares the sovereign power of the 
  people restricts legislative acts as well. The Constitution itself made it clear in Art. 
   98 by stipulating that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Land and thatany 
   legislative acts contrary to its provision are void and null. Moreover, the Constitution 
  vests the power of judicial review in the judiciary (Art. 81). This means that legislative 
   acts which restrict freedom of expression are subject to judicial review. The Supreme 
   Court thus plays a central role in providing constitutional protection to freedom of 
   expression. 
  1-2 Limits to Freedom of Expression 
     Freedom of expression, even though protected by the Constitution, is not literally 
   absolute. It must be circumscribed for the protection of the public welfare. 
     The Court has made this clear from the beginning. Thus, already inthe Emergency 
  Food Supply Order Case of 19492), the Court said: 
    1) For more detailed analysis, see L. Beer, Freedomof Expression in Japan: AStudy in Comparative Law, 
   Politics, and Society (1984), together with my book review, Matsui, Book Review, 34 Am. J. Com. L. 583 (1986). 
   2) The judgment of May 18, 1949, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 3, no. 6, at 839.
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     Free speech guaranteed by the new Constitution... naturally cannot be 
     arbitrarily curtailed even by statutes. Nevertheless, the public shouldnot
    abuse fundamental human rights guaranteed to them by the new Con-
     stitution. The public rather have responsibility to exercise theserights 
     for the public welfare.... Even free speech guaranteed by the newCon-
    stitution should not be exercised by the public in their utter license. It 
     should rather be accommodated to the interest of the public welfare. 
From this undeniable limits to freedom of expression, however, the Court all too easily 
jumped into a conclusion that the restriction an freedom of speech imposed by the 
Emergency Food Supply Order was constitutional. In this case, the defendant made a 
speech at the farmers assembly to the effect that farmers had been deceived by the 
Government and that they should better not seil their rice crops to the Government. 
Since the delivery of rice crops to the Government was mandated by the Food Control 
Act and the Emergency Food Supply Order, his speech was regarded as an advocacy 
of illegal conduct and he was prosecuted. In upholding his conviction, the Court said: 
     The Food Control Act was enacted under the current poor condition of 
    vital food supply for the purpose of securing its sufficient supply to the 
    general public. In order to accomplish that purpose, an obligation to seil 
    vital food to the Government is imposed by the Order under the 
    provisions of that Act. An advocacy such as this one urging the dis-
    obedience of that obligation... goes beyond the mere criticism of the 
     governmental policy and attacks an its failure. It rather underminesthe 
    public welfare by advocating a disobedience of important obligation 
    imposed upon the citizen by the statute. 
The Court thus concluded that the criminal punishment of advocacy of illegal conduct 
was constitutional. 
  The Court here did not inquire seriously what kind of speech the defendant had 
made and what kind of danger the speech had created. If the speech feil within the 
prescribed advocacy, under the Court's view, then its criminal punishment would be 
held constitutional. 
  The similar attitude can be observed also in the Lady Chatterley's Lover Case3' In 
this case, Bin Itoh, a famous novelist, translated and published the D. H. Lawrence's 
3) The judgment of March 13, 1957, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 11, no. 3, at 997.
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famous novel, "Lady Chatterley's Lover." He was prosecuted together with his 
publisher and was charged with a violation of Sec. 175 of the Criminal Law which 
prohibits he sale or distribution fobscene materials. The Court here again stated: 
    The Court has made itclear over and over again that fundamental human 
    rights, regardless of whether the possibility ofits restriction for thepublic 
    welfare is stipulated in each provision, cannot be abused by way of 
    Articles 12 and 13. They are subject to restriction for the public welfare 
    and are thus not unlimited... When we apply this general principle to 
    freedom of speech or freedom of expression, such freedom, highly 
    important asit may, can be restricted for the interest ofthe public welfare. 
And here again, the Court concluded without pause that the maintenance of the 
minimum level of sexual morality was unquestionably in accord with the public 
welfare and that he prohibition an publication ofobscene materials with the criminal 
punishment was thus constitutional. 
  Commentators were highly critical of these decisions of the Court. They attacked 
the Court's unlimited eference toward the judgments of the Diet and its almost total 
absence ofany judicial scrutiny. 
  In the 1960s, however, probably partly under the influence ofthese criticisms, the 
Court came to employ the interest balancing test in several cases. The most famous 
was the Hakata Station TV Film Subpoena Case 4) In this case, the district court was 
deciding whether to indict police officers for using brutal forces against public 
demonstrators. The court subpoenaed the TV Films an the scene of crash between 
demonstrators and police force which were broadcast an TV. The Court rejected the 
appeal from the TV stations against the subpoena. To decide the constitutionality of 
the subpoena, the Court said, it is necessary to balance competing factors. The Court 
held: 
     We have to consider an the one hand the nature, manner and seriousness 
     of the crime to be charged, the evidential value of Films, andinthe end 
    the necessity of these films to accomplish fair criminal trial. Against 
     these we have to balance an the other hand the degree of threat. o 
    news-gathering freedom of mass media to be caused by the subpoena, 
     the degree of burden upon the freedom of news-broadcasting and other 
4) The decision of Nov. 26, 1969, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 23, no. 11, at 1490.
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     various factors. And even when the films are deemed as necessary for 
     use as evidence for criminal trial, the resulting burden upon mass media 
     should be carefully tailored not to exceed the necessity. 
In this case, the Court found, the subpoenaed films had the extremely significant 
evidential value, almost essential, to decide the indictment. On the other hand, they 
were already broadcast an TV and the only burden upon mass media was the possible 
threat to future news-gathering activities. Even though such activities should be 
accorded ample respect in light of the underlying spirit of Art. 21, the Court found, 
this threat was uncertain and was outweighed by the imperative governmental interest 
in finding the truth. The subpoena was thus upheld. 
   Another epresentative case was the Sarufutsu Case.5) In this case, a postal worker 
in Sarufutsu city putted up several posters in support of a particular election candidate 
and distributed many others for sticking. All of this were conducted uring his off-duty 
hours and he did not use any facilities of the office. But he was prosecuted and was 
charged with a violation of Sec. 102 of the National Public Workers Act which 
comprehensively prohibits "any political activities" of national public workers. In 
deciding the constitutionality of the conviction, the Court here again balanced compet-
ing interests. The first factor to be considered was governmental interests. The 
legislative purposes of Sec. 102, securing political neutrality among public workers 
and maintaining public trust, were apparently legitimate. And the prohibition of 
political activities capable of undermining these interests, the Court found, bore 
reasonable relationship to legislative purposes. The second factor was freedom of 
expression of individual public worker. The prohibition was purported to curtail only 
conduct, and not personal opinion itself. The restriction an free speech was thus 
indirect and incidental. The third factor was the Balance between governmenta] 
interests and burdens upon freedom of speech. The Court then held that the incidental 
restriction upon free speech was outweighed by the overriding importance of 
governmental interests. The prohibition of almost all political activities of public 
workers was thus upheld. 
  The Court's use of the interest balancing test is certainly preferable to its earlier 
attitude of simply invoking the talismanic word of public welfare, paying almost otal 
deference toward the judgments of the Diet, thus refusing any meaningful scrutiny of 
legislative facts. Yet, even in applying the interest balancing test, the Court has never 
struck down any statutes restricting freedom of expression. While employing that test, 
5) The judgment of Nov. 6, 1974, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 28, no. 9, at 393.
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the Court has simply continued todefer to the judgments ofthe Diet, emphasizing the 
overriding importance of governmental interest while at the Same time undervaluing 
the degree freedom of expression is restricted. 
  Commentators a gue that freedom of expression ccupies the preferred position in 
the hierarchy ofconstitutional rights. Under the influence ofProfessor T.I. Emerson's 
work, this freedom isbelieved to be essential for self-realization of individual, Einding 
truth in marketplace of ideas, and functioning ofdemocracy. The judiciary bears, they 
thus argue, aspecial responsibility forprotecting this freedom. Itshould not presume 
the constitutionality of statutes restricting free speech unlike statutes restricting 
economic freedoms and should rather subject them to stritt scrutiny. 
  Nevertheless, the Court has continued to cling to its approach of paying total 
deference to the judgments of the Diet while occasionally employing the interest 
balancing test. No Court decision thus far has ever invalidated any statute r stricting 
freedom of expression. Apparently, in the Court's view, freedom of expression is not 
different from other freedoms. It is after all not accorded any meaningful constitutional 
protection from the Court.6) 
1-3. Analytical Framework 
  Leading commentators divide statutory estrictions an freedom of expression into 
two separate categories: restrictions based an contents (content-based restrictions) and 
restrictions ot based an contents (content eutral restrictions). And they would apply 
different s andards of review. The more stringent standard ofreview for content-based 
restrictions and less stringent standard ofreview for content eutral restrictions. While 
the Court seems to apply roughly the saure deferential review to both categories, it 
nevertheless tends to employ slightly different standards ofreview. I would hence 
follow leading commentators here and consider each category separately. 
               2. ANCILLARY DOCTRINES 
  The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression is thought to accompany 
with it several ancillary doctrines. The first is the prohibition of censorship. The 
second is the two interrelated doctrines based an the similar concern: the overbreadth 
6) The Court has implied that stricter Standard of eview may be applied to restriction an free Speech than to 
restriction an economic freedom. The judgment of April 30, 1975, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshu vol. 29, 
no. 4, at 572. Yet it was astatute restricting economic freedom that was truck down and the Court has never 
applied such stricter standard of eview in reviewing restriction an free speech to invalidate it.
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doctrine and the vagueness doctrine. And the third is the less restrictive alternative 
(LRA) doctrine. 
2-1. The Prohibition of Censorship 
  The Constitution explicitly prohibits censorship (Art. 21, Sec. 2). Since the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of expression entails the general Prohibition of prior 
restraint, his explicit Prohibition of censorship has caused a division of views an the 
scope of prohibited censorship as well as an the degree of Prohibition. The majority 
view defines censorship broadly as encompassing all forms of prior restraint an 
expression. Sec. 2, according to this view, simply makes the general Prohibition of 
prior restraint more explicit. The Prohibition, however, cannot be absolute. The 
Prohibition of censorship by Sec. 2 thus allows some exceptions. The minority view 
defines censorship narrowly to include only the traditional type of administrative 
censorship rior to publication. It holds, however, its Prohibition to be absolute. 
According to this view, Art. 21, Sec. 1 already entails the general Prohibition of prior 
restraint an expression. The significance of Sec. 2 thus lies in absolutely prohibiting 
such narrowly defined traditional type of administrative c nsorship. 
  The Court held in the Custom Bureau Inspection Case7) that the Prohibition of 
censorship was absolute with no exception. It took, however, a view of censorship as 
provided in Sec. 2 even narrower than the minority view. It defined censorship only 
to include '.'orte that entails the following elements: it is administered by the ad-
ministrative authority, its coverage reaches to the content of expressed thoughts and 
other ideas, its purpose is to prohibit all or part of publication and its characteristic is 
to review the content comprehensively and generally prior to publication and to 
prohibit he publication if deemed to be inappropriate." According to this definition, 
no prior restraint other than the outright censorship by the administrative authority 
would not fall within prohibited "censorship. " 
  At issue was Sec. 21, Subsec. 1 of the Custom Standard Act which prohibits 
importation of certain items from foreign countries. Its 3rd clause includes materials 
which "disturb social morality." Under the Custom Act, every importer has to submit 
an application for permit prior to importation. When custom officials found during 
custom inspection the imported material to fall within prohibited items, the custom 
office informs its decision to the importer, thus precluding the possibility of its 
importation. One importer challenged this procedure in light of the Prohibition of 
censorship stipulated in Art. 21, Sec. 2. The Court rejected, however, this challenge. 
7) The judgment of Dec. 12, 1984, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshu vol. 38, no. 12, at 1308.
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The custom inspection, the Court held, did not fall within prohibited censorship 
because of the following reasons. First, it was not prior restraint since the material 
involved was already published in foreign countries. Secondly, its purpose was to 
collect custom, and not to review the content of publication comprehensively and 
generally. Moreover, the prime job of custom office was not such regulation of the 
content of publication. And finally there was a room for judicial review. The Court 
thereby simply ignored the fact that the public is deprived of any opportunity to see 
foreign publications because of this System. 
  The Court also held in the Hoppou Journal Cases) that a judicial injunction against 
publication which was found to be defamatory did not fall within prohibited "censor-
ship" because the injunction was not issued from the administrative authority. The 
Court allowed such injunction, however, only under certain stringent and clear condi-
tions since it nevertheless constituted prior restraint an expression. 
2-2. The Overbreadth Doctrine and Vagueness Doctrine 
  The overbreadth doctrine allows the court to invalidate an unconstitutional statute 
which overbroadly restricts freedom of expression an its face, i.e., without considera-
tion of the specific case before the court. This doctrine is based upon the fear against 
the chilling effect an free speech which might be caused by such an overbroad statute. 
  The Court has, however, never applied such overbreadth doctrine. Eventhough 
many statutes were challenged as overbroadly infringing free speech, the Court upheld 
them either by declaring the constitutionality of these restrictions in toto9) or by limiting 
their coverage.10) 
  Based an the saure concern, the vagueness doctrine similarly allows the court to 
invalidate a vague criminal statute which restricts freedom of expression an its face. 
  The Court has suggested the possibility that vague criminal statutes restricting free 
speech could be invalidated for violation of the Constitution. If the statute fails to give 
sufficient notice to the average citizen as to the precise scope of prohibited conducts, 
the Court said in the Tokushima City Public Safety Ordinance Case,11) then the statute 
must fall. Yet the Court here concluded that the condition "to maintain traffic order" 
attached upon a permit for demonstration bythe Ordinance was not unconstitutionally 
 8) The judgment of June 11, 1986, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshu vol. 40, no. 4, at 872. 
 9) The judgment of Nov. 6, 1974, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 28, no. 9, at 393 (Sarufutsu Case). 
10) The judgment of June 22, 1983, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshu vol. 37, no. 5, at 793 (Prison I mates 
Newspaper C nsorship Case); the judgment of Dec. 12, 1984, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshu vol. 38, no. 
12, at 1308 (Custom Bureau Inspection Case). 
11) The judgment of Sept. 10, 1975, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 29, no. 8, at 489.
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vague. The Court has thus never actually invalidated any Statutes by employing this 
doctrine. 
2-3. The Less Restrictive Alternative Doctrine 
  The less restrictive alternative doctrine can be understood as a special variety of 
means analysis applicable when a statute restricting free speech is involved. If there 
is less restrictive alternative to accomplish intended govemmental end, this doctrine 
allows the court to invalidate the statute. 
   Commentators are generallyin favor of this doctrine. The lower court in the 
Sarufutsu Case applied this doctrine and invalidated a criminal ban an almost all forms 
of political activities of public workers.12) Yet the Court, as stated above, upheld such 
a ban in toto. 
     3. CONTENT BASED RESTRICTIONS ON EXPRESSION 
3-1. General Principles 
  When reviewing content-based restrictions an free speech, the Court tend to uphold 
them if they are necessary and reasonable r gulations to accomplish important govern-
mental interests. However, the Court tend to defer to judgments of the Diet and other 
public authorities. It has thus never subject hem to real strict scrutiny. 
  In contrast, most commentators insist an applying the clearand present danger test 
or the compelling interest est when reviewing content-based restrictions an free 
speech. The court, they argue, should not presume their constitutionality but subject 
them to strict scrutiny. 
3-2. Hostility Toward a Particular Viewpoint 
  The governmental ct which is based upon hostility toward a particular viewpoint 
should be subject o the most rigorous scrutiny. 
  Of course, the Govemment is unlikely to confess its hostility toward a particular 
viewpoint. Yet one example of this kind of restriction can be found in the Imperial 
Name and Stamp Counterfeit Case. In this case, a group planned to distribute 
pamphlets criticizing the Emperor. Since these pamphlets included print of the official 
Imperial Name and Stamp, the police seized almost all pamphlets for a violation of the 
12) The judgment of March 25, 1968, Asahikawa District Court, Kakeishu vol. 10, no. 3, at 293, overruled, the
judgment of Nov. 6, 1974, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 28, no. 9, at 393.
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prohibition of the counterfeit of the Imperial Name and Stamp (Criminal Law, Sec. 
154). Apparently the group did not have any intent o counterfeit the Imperial Name 
and Stamp. There was also apparently no danger that the public mistakenly took this 
print as a true Imperial Name and Stamp. Indeed, the police, upon learning that the 
group was planning to distribute these pamphlets, first attempted toseize them for thier 
defamatory nature toward the Emperor. Since it became apparent that the police could 
not charge criminal defamatio, the police came to invoke counterfeit charge to seize 
all pamphlets before distribution. Without doubt, the police seizure was out of sheer 
hostility toward the viewpoint expressed in the pamphlets.l3) 
3-3. Advocacy of Illegal Conducts 
  Advocacy of illegal conducts are prohibited in wide range of statutes. The pro-
hibited advocacies include: 
     1. advocacyof overthrow of the Govemment by violent force (Subver-
    sive Activities Prevention Act, Secs. 38, 39, & 40; Criminal Explosives 
     Control Act, Sec. 4) 
    2. advocacy of illegal strike (National Public Workers Act, Sec. 110, Cl. 
     17; Local Public Workers Act, Sec. 61, Cl. 4; Self Defense Force Act, 
     Sec. 119, Subsec. 1, Cls 2, 3 & Subsec. 2) 
     3. advocacy of illegal disclosure of govemmental secret (National Public 
    Workers Act, Secs. 109, 111; Local Public Workers Act, Sec. 60, Subsecs. 
     2, 62; Self Defense Force Act, Sec. 118, Subsec. 1) 
    4. advocacy of tax evasion (National Tax Evasion Control Act, Sec. 22, 
     Subsec. 1; Local Tax Act, Sec. 21, Subsec. 1) 
  The Court construed the word "advocacy" as.used in Local Tax Act, Sec. 21, as act 
"intentionally giving impetus to others by documents
, pictures or conducts with such 
force as to bring about decision to accomplish these prohibited conducts or to prompt 
the decision already made.14j And the Court has adopted the saure definition with 
respect o word "advocacy" or "incitement" as used in other statutes. 
  The leading case with respect to the prohibition of advocacy of illegal conducts is 
13) The district ourt thus held the seizure unconstitutional. The decision f March 5, 1985, Osaka District 
Court., Hanrei Times vol. 556, at 217. Yet, the tort action against the Government for this allegedly unconstitu-
tional seizure was ultimately rejected by the Court. The judgment of Dec. 13, 1990, Ist petty bench, Asahishinbun 
Dec. 14, 1990. 
14) The judgment of Feb. 21, 1962, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 16, no. 2, at 107.
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the above-mentioned Emergency Food Supply Order Case.l5) In this case, the Court 
upheld the criminal punishment of a defendant who made advocacy simply deferring 
to the judgment of the Diet. According to the Court's holding, if the speech feil within 
prescribed advocacy, it then did not matter whether the Speech was direct incitement 
or indirect or abstract advocacy of doctrine. Nor it mattered what danger the Speech 
had created or whether the danger was imminent. Indeed, the Court here did not inquire 
seriously what the defendant had exactly stated and what danger the defendant's 
statement had created. 
  Commentators have been thus very critical of the Court's stance. They rather insist 
an applying the clear and present danger test or the Brandenburg test16) enunciated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the Court has affirmed its earlier Position and 
has upheld all restrictions an advocacy of illegal conducts.17) In the most recent case 
concerning criminal prosecution under the Subversive Activities Prevention Act, for 
instance, the Court quite summarily rejected the argument that the Government could 
not prohibit subversive speech unless there was clear and present danger. In this case, 
several leaders ofthe left-wing radicals urged before their members to "occupy the 
Metropolitan government" and to "storm the Prime Minister's House:' They were 
prosecuted for their advocacy of subversive conducts for political motivation. The 
Court, in upholding their conviction, held that such advocacy, being capable of 
producing grave threats to social safety, was incompatible with the public welfare and 
was thus unworthy of constitutional protection.18) 
3-4. Election Campaign 
  Political speech is believed to occupy the central place among protected expression. 
Nevertheless, political speech is most rigorously curtailed in Japan. 
  Thus the Public Offices Election Act Sets up limited election campaign period (Sec. 
15) The judgment of May 18, 1949, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 3, no. 6, at 839. 
16) Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
17) The judgment of Jan. 9, 1952, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 6, no. 1, at 4; the judgment of Aug. 
29, 1952, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Keishu vol. 6, no. 8, at 1053; the judgment of April 27,1954, Supreme 
Court, 3rd petty bench, Keishu vol. 8, no. 4, at 555; the judgment ofMay 20, 1954, Supreme Court, Ist petty 
bench, Keishu vol. 8, no. 5, at 692; the judgment of Nov. 30, 1955, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 9, 
no. 12, at 2545; the judgment ofFeb. 21, 1962, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 16, no. 2, at 107; the 
judgment of April 25, 1973, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 27, no. 4, at 547; the judgment of May 21, 
1976, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 30, no. 5, at 1178. The Court also even upheld the constitutionality 
of criminal punishment of attempt to advocacy. The judgment of Dec. 18, 1989, Supreme Court, Ist petty bench, 
Hanrei Times vol. 717, at 46. 
18) The judgment of Sep. 28, 1990, Supreme Court, 2d petty bench, Asahisinbun Sept. 29, 1990.
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129) and prohibits election campaign before that period (Sec. 239). It also prohibits 
door-to-door canvassing (Sec. 138) and solicitation for signature (Sec. 138-2). It 
places almost otal ban an distribution of pamphlets (Sec. 142) as well as an posting 
of written documents (Sec. 143). Moreover it places severe limits an public meetings 
and gatherings (Secs. 161-66). Because of these restrictions, the almost only permis-
sible method of election campaign in Japan is limited to repeatedly announcing the 
names of candidates an sound-trucks. 
  These restrictions have been under fire from commentators and general public. Yet 
the Court has consistently upheld them. In upholding the limitation of election 
campaign to designated campaign period, for instance, the Court said:l9) 
    If election campaign for public candidates were constantly permitted, 
     improper or unnecessary competitions might be resulted, thuscreating 
     dangers that fairness of election might be undermined by the occurrences 
     of illegal conducts because of the difficulty of regulations. Or wanton 
    spending and campaign work might cause imbalance among candidates 
     because of their unequal spending capacities, thus bringing about corrup-
     tions of election. In order to prevent hese dangers and to securefairness 
     of election, it is therefore essential to limit election campaign to a 
    relatively short period, to designate the fixed starting date, and to let every
     candidate compete in campaigning under the same conditions as possible. 
    Sec. 129 of the Public Offices Election Act was purported to meet that 
     demand and provided that election campaign must be from the dateof 
     candidacy registration to the date before the voting day. Since securing 
     fairness in election comports with the public welfare, such limitation an 
    election campaign to designated period and prohibition of campaign prior 
     to that period can be said as permissible, necessary and reasonable 
     restrictions an freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution... 
The Court has never explained, however, of what "improper or unnecessary competi-
tions" might be resulted nor why the Government was allowed to make sure every 
candidate to compete in substantially equal spending capacity. It has also never 
explained of why limitation an campaign period was essential to accomplish compel-
ling govemmental interests, if any. 
  Door-to-door canvassing isthe most ypical and usual method of election campaign 
19) The judgment of April 23, 1969, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 23, no.4, at 235.
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in Western ations. Yet it was prohibited when the universal suffrage was first 
acknowledged in this country. This prohibition survived the constitutional change and 
was introduced into the Public Offices Election Act. And the Court showed its 
willingness touphold this kind of prohibition against the constitutional attack already 
in 1950 20) Noting that "door-to-door canvassing entails various problems," the Court 
hastened toconclude: 
    Art. 21 of the Constitution does not guarantee unlimited freedom of 
    speech but rather naturally admits the possibility of reasonable r stric-
     tions as to time, place, and manner of speech for the publicwelfare. 
     Incidental restriction an free speech resulting from a ban an door-to-door 
     canvassing in order to secure fairness of election... thusdoes not run 
     counter to the Constitution. 
The Court here again did not specify what kind of problems door-to-door canvassing 
might bring about and why absolute ban was essential toprevent whatever p oblems 
it may bring about. Several justifications have been offered by some commentators. 
The ban, it has been argued, can be justified primarily because it is necessary to prevent 
illegal fixing and to protect residents from unconsented visitors. These govemmental 
interests are undeniably legitimate and important. But it is still doubtful whether total 
ban an door-to-door canvassing is essential to secure these governmental interests. 
Nevertheless, the Court has affirmed this holding ever since despite strong academic 
and popular c iticism and despite some lower court holdings contrary toit.21) 
  The Court also upheld the almost total ban an distribution of pamphlets.22) Sec. 
146, the Court held, was enacted because 
     unlimited distribution or posting of written documents as to election 
    might result in improper competition in election campaign, consequently 
    creating dangers that free and fair election might be hindered and its 
20) The judgment of Sep. 27, 1950, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 4, no. 9, at 1799. 
21) The judgment of Nov. 21,1967, Supreme Court, 3rd petty bench, Keishu vol. 21, no.9, at 1245; the judgment 
of April 23, 1969, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 23, no. 4, at 235; the judgment of June 15, 1981, 
Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Keishu vol. 35, no. 4, at 205; the judgment of July 21, 1981, Supreme Court, 
3rd petty bench, Keishu vol. 35, no. 5, at 568; the judgment of March 23, 1982, Supreme Court, 3rd petty'bench, 
Keishu vol. 36, no. 3, at 339; the judgment of Nov. 10, 1983, Supreme Court, Ist petty bench, Keishu vol. 37, 
no. 9, at 1368; the judgment of Jan. 20, 1984, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Keishu vol. 38, no. 1, at 1; the 
judgment of Feb. 21, 1984, Supreme Court, 3rd petty bench, Keishu vol. 38, no. 3, at 387. 
22) The judgment of March 30, 1955, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 9, no. 3, at 635.
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    fairness might become hardly maintainable. That Provision therefore 
    placed certain limitations an distribution and posting of written docu-
     ments during the election campaign period in order to prevent such 
    dangers. This degree of limitation could be then viewed as a necessary 
    and reasonable restriction for the public welfare permitted under the 
     Constitution. 
The Court here again never explained of what kind of "improper competition" could 
be resulted from free distribution of pamphlets nor what kind of danger to free and fair 
election could be created. Nor it did specify to what degree the danger was imminent. 
Nor it ever explained why almost total ban an distribution and posting of written 
documents was essential to prevent hese dangers. The Court has nevertheless affirmed 
this holding since then. 23) 
3-5. Defamation 
  Defamatory speech, either oral or written, is subject o criminal as well as civil 
sanctions. 
  Sec. 230 of the Criminal Law punishes those who made defamatory speech toward 
others by pointing out facts in public. It punishes every defendant who made 
defamatory speech regardless of whether it is false or true.24) This Provision was 
originally adopted into the Criminal Law while the Meiji Constitution was in effect. 
At that time, when the defendant made defamatory speech, there was no way to claim 
immunity. 
  When the Japanese Constitution was adopted, many thought his criminal defama-
tion Provision unconstitutionally restricted protected freedom. The Criminal Law was 
thus amended and new Sec. 230-2 was added. The Subsec. 1 of Sec. 230-2 thus 
declares that a defendant who made defamatory speech as to matters of public interest 
for the Sole purpose of advancing public interest is immune from punishment if he or 
she proves that speech was true. And Subsec. 2 irrebuttably presumes that a speech 
was concerned with the matter of public interest if it is issued upon unprosecuted 
criminal suspect. And Subsec. 3 provides that the defendant who made defamatory 
23) The judgment of April 6, 1955, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 9, no. 4, at 819; judgment of Nov. 
18, 1964, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 18, no. 7, at 561; the judgment of April 23, 1969, Supreme 
Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 23, no. 4, at 235; the judgment of March 23, 1982, Supreme Court, 3rd petty 
bench, Keishu vol. 36, no. 3, at 339. 
24) If one made defamatory speech toward others without pointing out facts in public, he may be punished for 
vilifrcation. The Criminal Law, Sec. 231. Yet he Criminal prosecution under Sec. 231 is quite rare.
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speech as to public officials or election candidates for public offices is immune from 
punishment if he or she could only show that his or her speech was true. 
  Sec. 230 of the Criminal Law, thus amended, was upheld by theCourt. 5) "Article 
21 of the Constitution," said the Court, "does not guarantee unlimited freedom of 
speech.... It is an abuse of free speech to defame others. Defamatory speech t us does 
not fall within constitutionally protected freedom of speech." And the Court has 
affirmed this holding thereafter26) 
  Even though the Constitution does not have a provision explicitly protecting 
reputation ofan individual, no one doubts the permissibility for the Diet to protect i
by restricting defamatory speech. Yet, Sec. 230-2 an its face still punishes defendant 
who made defamatory speech as to matters of public interest for the sole purpose of 
advancing public interest if he or she fails to prove that his or her speech was true. 
The Court had thus first denied immunity to such defendant.27) Defense of truth is 
important. But to require adefendant toprove his or her speech to be true is very 
demanding and it often induces elf-censorship. Recognizing this hardship, the Court 
reversed its previous decision and came to hold: 
     Sec. 230-2 of the Criminal Law attempts toaccommodate th necessity 
     of protecting reputation of individual s a person and protection of free 
     speech guaranteed byArt. 21 of the Constitution. In light of this 
     attempted accommodation andBalance between two interests, it is proper 
     to construe Sec. 230-2 of the Criminal Law as immunizing defendant 
    who made defamatory speech from punishment for want of criminal 
     intent, if the defendant made speech out of mistaken belief thathis or her 
    speech was true and if there was probable ground for his or her mistaken 
     belief based upon sure information and sources even whenheor she 
     could not prove that his or her speech was true. 
The Court hus expanded the protection accorded todefamatory speech2g) 
  Commentators a egenerally infavor of this expansion fprotection. The focus is 
then placed upon the definition of "matters ofpublic interest." The Court held in the 
Monthly Pen Case29) that "matters ofpublic interest" should be "defined objectively 
25) The judgment of April 10, 1958, Supreme Court, Ist petty bench, Keishu vol. 12, no. 5, at 830. 
26) The judgment of April 16, 1981, Supreme Court, Ist petty bench, Keishu vol. 35, no. 3, at 84. 
27) The judgment of May 7, 1959, Supreme Court, Ist petty bench, Keishu vol, 13, no. 5, at 641. 
28) The judgment of June 25, 1969, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 23, no. 7, at 975. 
29) The judgment of April 16, 1981, Supreme Court, Ist petty bench, Keishu vol. 35, no. 3, at 84.
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in light of the content and nature of facts pointed out themselves." The method of 
expression or degree of investigation, it thus held, should not influence upon this 
decision. In this case, the magazine "Monthly Pen" reported awomanizing scandal of 
Daisaku Ikeda, the President of the Souka-Gakkai, as a part of continuing criticism 
against he Souka-Gakkai. The Souka-Gakkai is a very influential religious organiza-
tion and has a strong connection with the Komei Party, third largest party in the Diet. 
Even though the reported facts concerned with private life of an individual, the Court 
thus held that this report feil within "matters of public interest." 
  Those who made defamatory speech toward othersare also subject to civil sanction. 
The Civil Law allows people to file a tort action to recover damages against defamation 
(Secs. 709 & 710)30) or to seek other remedies to restore damaged reputation (Sec. 
723).31) Unlike the Criminal Law, the Civil Law does not contain any provision 
specifying the conditions for damage action or conditions for the defendant to claim 
immunity. Nevertheless, almost he Same doctrine has developed. And even though 
there is no provision in civil tort action comparable to Sec. 230-2 of the Criminal Law, 
the Court has afforded similar immunity to the civil defendant as well.32) 
3-6. Commercial Speech 
  Commercial speech is restricted in various statutes. The purposes of these restric-
tions could be divided into two categories: protection of consumers and protection of 
30) The Civil Law does not allow punitive damages. The amount of damage usually awarded to efamation 
plaintiff s less than $10,000, mostly $1.000 to$2.000. Many thus argue that damage award istoo Small to 
compensate the loss. 
31) The remedy most often used is a forced publication of apology. Even though the Civil Law does not mention 
about the injunctive relief, the Court held that the plaintiff could also seek injunctive relief. The judgment of 
June 11, 1986, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshu vol 40, no. 4, at 872 (the Hoppou Journal case). 
32) The judgment of inne 23, 1966, Supreme Court, Ist petty bench, Minshu vol. 20, no. 5, at 1118. See also 
the judgment of April 24, 1987, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Minshu vol. 41, no. 3, at 490. 
   There are two significant differences b tween criminal defamation law and civil defamation law. First, he 
criminal intent is necessary in the former, while negligence is sufficient i  the latter. And secondly, thedefendant 
could be liable only when he or she pointed out he facts in public nthe former, while the defendant could be 
held liable for his or her defamatory opinion i  the latter. In a recent case, however, the Court accepted he"fair 
comment" privilege. The judgment of Dec. 21, 1989, Supreme Court, Ist petty bench, Minshu vol. 43, no. 12, 
at 2252. In this case, the defendant dis ributed handbills criticizing the conducts of public school teachers who 
had refused to comply with the school principals' order to change the assessment standard for evaluation sheets 
of students and characterized th se t achers as "harmful and incompetent t achers." Since the facts depicted in 
the handbills were substantially true, the Court accepted hedefendant's claim that this was fair comment a  
matters of public concern with the purpose of promoting public nterest and was immune from civil liability. The 
Court ordered the defendant, however, to pay damages for emotional distress caused by listing the names, 
addresses, and phone-numbers of these t achers an the handbills, thus inviting threats and intimidations t  them.
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free and fair competition. And the types of these restrictions could be divided into 
following four categories: 
     1. prohibition of false advertisement (Medical Treatment Act, Sec. 69, 
     Subsec. 6, Sec. 71, Subsec. 5; Pharmaceutical Act, Sec. 66, Subsec. 1; 
     Food Safety Act, Sec. 12; Travel Agency Act, Sec. 12-8) 
    .2. Prohibition of deceptive, misleading, or exaggerated advertisement 
     (Pharmaceutical Act, Sec. 66, Subsecs. 1 & 2; Food Safety Act, Sec. 12) 
     3. prohibition of advertisement of illegal conducts (Prostitution Preven-
     tion Act, Sec. 5, Subsec. 3, Sec. 6, Subsec. 3) 
     4. other prohibitions (Medical TreatmentAct, Sec. 69, Subsecs. 1 & 3, 
     Sec. 71, Subsecs. 1 & 3) 
These restrictions are unique to commercial speech.33) 
  The Court gave almost no protection to commercial speech. The leading case in 
this regard is a case involving criminal prosecution under Sec. 7 of the Massagists, 
Acupuncturists, Moxibustionists, and Judo Rehabilitationists Act, which limited per-
missible subjects of advertisement to name, address and other listed information and 
specifically prohibited advertisement of ability or experience.34) The defendant, a
moxibustionist, distributed handbills which described possible ffect of his service and 
was charged with a violation of Sec. 7. The Court upheld the conviction. This ban was 
placed, the Court held, 
    because theDiet feared that permitting unlimited advertisement might 
    possibly bring about false or exaggerated advertisement in attempt o 
     attract_ customers, thus creating dangers that the general public, being
    confused, might consequently miss the opportunity to receive timelyand 
     adequate medical treatment. Prohibiting advertisement except an 
     specified subjects in order to prevent hese dangers in advance mustbe
     allowed as a necessary means to maintain the public welfare from the
    standpoint of protecting public health and safety. 
33) In addition tothese statutory restrictions, there isa code of comprehensive self-imposed restriction n 
advertisement industry (Commercial Ethic Code) as well as code of self-imposed restriction an advertisement in 
each industry (like newspaper, broadcasting, or magazine publishing dustry). 
34) The judgment of Feb. 15, 1961, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 15, no. 2, at 347.
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Commercial speech can be restricted, in short, if the Diet found it capable of bringing 
about some kind of danger to the public health and safety. 
  Commentators are divided. Some contend that pure commercial speech is to be 
seen as economic activity unprotected by Art. 21. Many contend, however, that even 
pure commercial speech should be protected under Art. 21 for it serves important 
social function of providing useful information to consumers. The degree of protection 
to be accorded to commercial speech, they nevertheless argue, should not necessarily 
be the saure as that accorded to political speech. Since commercial speech has less 
significant speech interest or it is located not in the Center of the constitutional 
protection, they continue, it is enough to accord less constitutional protection. The 
prevailing view thus upholds restrictions an commercial speech if the speech is false, 
misleading or exaggerated, if it involves advocacy of illegal conduct, or if restriction 
is otherwise necessary to accomplish important govemmental interests. 
3-7. Obscenity 
  Sale as well as distribution of "obscene" materials are prohibited by Sec. 175 of 
the Criminal Law. 
  As stated above, the Court upheld the constitutionality pf Sec. 175 in the Lady 
Chatterley's Lover Case.35) The Criminal Prohibition an sale and distribution of 
obscene materials, Said the Court, was necessary to maintain the public welfare, i. e., 
to maintain the "minimum level of sexual morality." Moreover, in reaching this 
conclusion, the Court opined that one essential characteristic of human-being is to 
Sense shame. Aversion to open sexual conduct, according to the Court, is just one 
manifestation of this sense of shame. The Court admitted the possibility that he public 
attitude toward obscenity might change. It nevertheless held that this aversion to open 
sexual conduct was beyond change. The Court then went an to declare: 
     Even if the ethical sense of vast majority of people werenumbed and 
     even if they would refuse to admit truly obscene material to be obscene, 
     the court must follow the norm of social common sense, thatis, con-
     sciousness of men of decent morality, and guard the society from moral 
     denigration. For the law and court must not approve the changingsocial 
    reality but rather play a clinical role against moral denigration by taking 
     critical stance to it. 
35) The judgment of March 13, 1957, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 11, no. 3, at 997. 
36) The judgment of Oct. 15, 1969, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 23, no. 10, at 1239.
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This holding was affirmed thereafter in a case involving the "In Praise of Vice" written 
by Marques de Sade 36) and has been followed since then.37) 
  According to the Court, "obscenity" is an expression which "wantonly excites or 
stimulates sexual desire, offends normal Sense of the ordinary people to feel shame for 
sexual conduct, and runs counter to decent sexual morality.s38) Whether a particular 
material isor is not obscene should be decided in light of the document taken as a 
whole. And even if the material has artistic or literal value, it can be obscene. The 
Court hus rejected argument that highly artistic or literal expression could not be 
prohibited asobscene or argument that he court should balance artistic or literal value 
of the material gainst social interest in preventing obscenity before upholding con-
viction39) The Court also rejected the argument that he definition of obscenity as used 
in Sec. 175 was unconstitutionally vague 40) 
  This fundamental framework has not been changed a bit. Yet the Court recently 
showed some signs to narrow the scope of obscenity. In a recent case,4j) the Court 
held as follows: 
     In deciding the obscene nature of a document, it is necessary to consider 
     many factors, including whether the document, taken as a whole,can be 
    generally said to appeal to prurient interest of the readers in light of the 
    degree and method of explicit and detailed sexual depiction and descrip-
    tion involved in that document, the ratio of that depiction and description 
    against the document asa whole, the relationship betweenthat depiction 
     and description a d the thought expressed in that document,the structure 
     and flow of the document, and the degree that sexual Stimulus was 
     reduced by artistic or philosophical nature of that document. The court 
     should ecide whether it "wantonly excites or stimulates sexualdesire, 
37) The judgment of Nov. 28, 1980, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Keishu vol. 34, no. 6, at 433; the judgment 
of March 8,1983, Supreme Court, 3rd petty bench, Keishu vol. 37, no. 2, at 15; the judgment of Oct. 27, 1983, 
Supreme Court, Ist petty bench, Keishu vol. 37, no. 8, at 1294. See also the judgment of Dec. 12, 1984, Supreme 
Court, grand bench, Minshu vol. 38, no. 12, at 1308. 
38) The judgment of March 13, 1957, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 11, no. 3, at 997. 
39) The judgment of Oct. 15, 1969, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 23, no. 10, at 1239. 
40) The judgment of Nov. 28,1980, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Keishu vol. 34, no. 6, at 433; the judgment 
of March 8,1983, Supreme Court, 3rd petty bench, Keishu vol. 37, no. 2, at 15. 
41) The judgment of Nov. 28, 1980, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Keishu vol. 34, no. 6, at 433.
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     offends normal sense of the ordinary people to feel shame for sexual 
     conduct, and runs counter to decent sexual morality" in lightof the 
     contemporary good social common sense by taking all these factors in 
     consideration. 
Although the Court upheld the conviction in this case, this Court holding prompted 
some lower courts to acquit he defendants prosecuted under Sec. 175 by denying the 
obscene nature of the documents charged. Yet the Court has still steadily refused to 
limit the prohibition to so-called hard-core pornography.42) 
  Commentators are highly fragmented.Some support the Court's holding but some 
contend that, while the prohibition of distribution of obscene materials is constitutional, 
Sec. 175 should be narrowly construed to prohibit only hard-core pomography. 
Another commentators insist that Sec. 175 is unconstitutional since there is no reason 
to prohibit obscenity. The Government should not be allowed, they claim, to prohibit 
expressive activity in order to maintain sexual morality. There are also some who argue 
for its unconstitutionality because of its overbreadth and vagueness. 
     4. CONTENT NEUTRAL RESTRICTIONS ON EXPRESSION 
4-1. General Principle 
  When time, place, and manner of expression is restricted, the Court showed its 
willingness to uphold restrictions so far as they are reasonable. Moreover, in deciding 
the reasonableness of these content-neutral regulations, the Court appears to give 
slightly more deference to the judgments of the Diet and other public authorities than 
with respect o content-based restrictions. 
   In contrast, most commentators insist that the Court should subject content-neutral 
restrictions to more demanding scrutiny. The review does not have to be as stringent 
as one to be applied to content-based restriction. Yet the court should, they insist, at 
least employ the less restrictive alternative doctrine. 
42) The judgment of March 8, 1983, Supreme Court, 3rd petty bench, Keishu vol. 37, no. 2, at 15. Besides Sec. 
175 of Ihe Criminal Law, many local governments have o-called "youth protection ordinances" r tricting such 
materials which are "sexually stimulating or encouraging extreme brutality" and are capable of interfering with 
Sound fostering of the youths. These materials renot "obscene" as defined bythe Court. The Court upheld such 
ordinance, however, simply by saying that such an ordinance was a reasonable m asure to prevent widely 
acknowledged social evils. The judgment of Sept. 19, 1989, Supreme Court, 3rd petty bench, Keishu vol. 43, no. 
8, at 785.
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4-2. Anti-Noise Regulations 
  Even though some municipalities have anti-noise regulations an street expression, 
there is no comprehensive statute regulating the noise level of expression 431 There is 
no case law conceming the constitutionality of such anti-noise regulations. 
4-3. Restrictions an Handbills 
  Distribution of handbills or pamphlets is free an the public street. Yet in some 
facilities, such as city hall or railroad station, such an activity is prohibited altogether 
or severely regulated. 
  The Court upheld aban an distribution f handbills an the premise ofprivate 
railroad station under Sec. 35 of the Railroad Business Act44) Such aban, it held, was 
necessary and reasonable restriction a free speech inorder to protect the property 
right or management authority of railroad companies. 
4-4. Restrictions anPosters and Billboards 
  Posters and billboards are strictly regulated. 
  The Billboard Act authorizeseach municipality to adopt necessary regulations an 
billboards and most municipalities have thus adopted Billboard Ordinances, which 
prohibit posters and billboards anpublic facilities, such as electricity polls, street trees, 
or postal deposits. 
  The Court upheld such regulations against the constitutional attack. In the Osaka 
City Billboard Ordinance Case,45) theCourt held that the maintenance of b autiful and 
enjoyable surroundings of the city fully comported with the public welfare. "This 
degree ofregulation," it thus concluded, "can be said as a necessary and reasonable 
restriction a  freedom ofexpression permissible in order to maintain the public 
welfare."46) 
  Sticking posters an private property without getting consent is also prohibited by
Sec. 1, Cl. 33 of the Misdemeanor Act. The Court upheld this restriction as anecessary 
and reasonable orte in order to protect private property, even though t e private property 
involved inthis case was electricity polls owned by the electric power company, 
semi-public entity.47) 
43) Cf. the Act o Preserve Serenity in he Vicinities of the Diet Building and the Foreign Embassy Buildings 
of 1988. 
44) The judgment of Dec. 18, 1984, Supreme Court, 3rd petty bench, Keishu vol. 38, no. 12, at 3026, 
45) The judgment of Dec. 18, 1968, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 22, no. 13, at 1549. 
46) See also judgment of March 3, 1987, Supreme Court, 3rd petty bench, Keishu vol. 41, no. 2, at 15. 
47) The judgment of June 17, 1970, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 24, no. 6, at 280.
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        5. PUBLIC MEETINGS AND DEMONSTRATIONS 
5-1. Public Meetings and Demonstrations 
  Art. 21 explicitly protects "freedom of assembly." The right to hold public meet-
ings is thus unquestionably protected. And even though the Constitution does not refer 
to the right to conduct mass demonstration, there is no doubt that it should also be 
protected. 
  However, even these rights must yield to restrictions for the public welfare. The 
right to conduct mass demonstration is hence subject to restrictions by the Public Safety 
Ordinance of each municipality and by the Road Traffic Act. And the right to hold 
public meetings at parks is subject o restriction by the park authority. 
5-2. The Public Safety Ordinances 
  Mass demonstrations were free after the World War II. When demonstrations came 
to threaten the public safety, however, the General Headquarters of the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers prompted the local government to regulate such 
demonstrations. Many municipalities responded by enacting so-called Public Safety 
Ordinances. Precise language and scheme vary but they generally require the advance 
notification or application for permit o conduct demonstration an public streets. The 
permit is usually given if planned emonstration satisfies certain conditions listed in 
the Ordinances. On the other hand, the permit is usually denied if planned emonstra-
tion is likely to threaten the public safety. Demonstration may be permitted under 
modified plan or some conditions may be attached an permit. Participants of 
demonstration without permit or demonstration which violated attached conditions are 
punished with criminal penalty. 
  In a 1954 case involving the Niigata Prefecture Public Safety Ordinance, the Court 
first confronted this issue 48) The Court held mere notification requirement was 
permissible. Since public demonstration is constitutionally protected, itwould be thus 
unconstitutional toenact general licensing system. The Court intimated, however, that 
it was constitutional to require permit in advance with respect o particular place or 
manner under easonable and clear standards. And it was also constitutional torefuse 
permit when the clear and imminent danger to the public safety was anticipated. The 
Court, while upholding the constitutionality of the Public Safety Ordinance, thus 
significantly limited its reach. 
  When the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Tokyo Metropolitan Public 
48) The judgment of Nov. 24, 1954, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 8, no. 11, at 1866.
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Safety Ordinance in 1960, it changed its view.49) Even though public demonstration 
is constitutionally protected, the Court insisted, ithas a potential to become amob 
instantly. It is thus constitutional forthe local govemment to enact necessary and 
minimum easure tosecure law and order. And the Court upheld the general permit 
requirement of he Ordinance despite its 1954 holding. Since the Ordinance involved 
obliged the police authority ogive permit unless ademonstration is apparently likely 
to cause direct danger to the public safety, the Court hought, the regulation could be 
deemed constitutional. This holding came close to saying that mass demonstration 
was nothing but riot and Gould be restricted in order to prevent whatever possible 
dangers to the public safety it might bring about. 
  Some lower courts responded, however, to this Court decision by acquitting some 
demonstration participants while admitting the constitutionality of the Ordinances. 
They held that participants of demonstration without permit or demonstration which 
violated attached conditions should still be immune from punishment if demonstration 
did sause no specific threat or only negligible threat to the public safety undeserving 
of criminal punishment. And some lower court even refused to follow the Court 
precedent and held the Ordinance unconstitutional. 
  The Court nevertheless reversed all these lower court decisions. The Court held 
that it was constitutional to punish participants, hough there were no specific threat 
or only negligible threat to the public safety.50) The Court further held in the Tokushima 
City Public Safety Ordinance Case51) that the condition attached an the permit o 
"maintain the traffic order" was not unconstitutionally vague. 
  Commentators a egenerally critical of the Court. Mostcommentators in ist hat 
demonstration is the unique form of expression easily resorted to by ordinary people. 
It should not be hence prohibited, they conclude, unless there is a clear and present 
danger to the public safety. 
5-3. Demonstration a d Traffic Safety 
  Demonstration is also subject toregulation u der the Road Traffic Act for securing 
the traffic safety. 
  The Court upheld such aregulation i  the Enterprise Protest Demonstration Case.52) 
Sec. 77, Subsec. 1of the Road Traffic Act, together with the order of the Prefecture, 
49) The judgment of July 20, 1960, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 14, no. 9, at 1243. 
50) The judgment of Oct. 24, 1975, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Keishu vol. 29, no. 9, at 777; the judgment 
of Oct. 24, 1975, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Keishu vol. 29, no. 9, at 860. 
51) The judgment of Sept. 10, 1975, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 29, vol. 8, at 489. 
52) The judgment of Nov. 16, 1982, Supreme Court, 3rd petty bench, Keishu vol. 36, no. 11, at 908.
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required demonstrators toacquire advance permit. The Court rejected the constitu-
tional attack against his general permit requirement. It held, however, that the police 
could not refuse permit unless demonstration was likely to impair general traffie 
significantly and such an impairment could not be prevented by attaching conditions 
an the permit. 
5-4. Public Meetings at Parks and Other Public Forum 
  The right to hold public meetings at parks is subject o restriction by the park 
authority. Some park authorities thus require an advance permit. They then refuse to 
grant he permit if the planned meeting would be likely to impair the park or otherwise 
interfere with the management of the park by the authority. 
  The typical Gase was presented in the May Day Meeting at the Exterior Garden of 
the Emperor's Palace Case 53) The union planned to hold a May Day meeting at the 
Exterior Garden of the Emperor's Palace and applied for a permit. Yet the Welfare 
Minister refused to grant a permit because the meeting might cause damages to the 
Garden. The Union filed a suit attacking the refusal, insisting that similar May Day 
meetings were previously permitted and that there was no clear and present danger for 
causing serious damages to the Garden. 
  The Court dismissed the suit for being moot because the planned ate of meeting 
had passed. Yet the Court went an to register its opinion utterly in dicta an the merit 
and upheld the constitutionality of the refusal. lt was constitutional for the Welfare 
Minister, the Court intimated, to refuse the permit when he thought the planned meeting 
would cause serious damages to the Garden and prevent other general public to use 
that Garden for its most natural use. 
  The same rule would applyto other public forum such as city hall, public theater, 
or public concert hall as well. Yet the manager of the public facility should not be 
allowed to refuse the public use because of the content of the expression. And the 
manager should not be allow to refuse the public use based upon a fear of disturbances 
to be caused by the third party. This situation is often presented when the Japan 
Teachers Union plans to hold meetings because the right-wing hecklers always come 
to interfer with the meetings with loud sound-trucks, yelling and cursing the Uion, and 
sometimes cause bodily injuries and property damages to Union members and sur-
rounding houses and stores. The managers of the public facility often responded to 
this by revoking the permit for use when they learned that the Japan Teachers Union 
was involved. The number of lower courts refused, however, to let the revocation to 
53) The judgment of Dec. 23, 1953, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishü vol. 7, no. 13, at 1561.
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stand, because the revocation was held to be unconstitutional violations of the right of 
freedom of expression.54) 
    6. THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE AND GATHER INFORMATION 
6-1. The Right to Receive and Gather Information 
  Even though Art. 21 only mentions to expression, it is widely believed that it also 
protects the right o receive information as well as the right o gather information. For 
the right of expression s meaningless if one cannot receive orgather information. 
  The Court also acknowledged in the Prison Inmates Newspaper Censorship Case, 
to be discussed below, that he people have a right to read newspaper. Moreover, as 
discussed below, the Court has accorded some constitutional protection to news-gather-
ing activities. 
6-2. Restrictions an the Right to Receive Information 
  In ordinary situations, one is free to receive information. Yet, in certain situations, 
the people's right o receive information may be curtailed. 
  One such situation is presented in the Prison Inmates Newspaper Censorship 
Case55) The Prison Act allows the inmates to read books and newspapers but it 
authorizes the prison authority to censor and ban or delete whatever portions the 
authority judges to be inappropriate. The Court acknowledged that he prison inmates 
had a right to read newspaper p otected by Art. 13 and Art. 21. It thus narrowly 
construed the Act to allow ban or deletion only "when there is considerable likelihood 
to generate he degree of serious problems which cannot be neglected for keeping 
discipline and order of the prison." Moreover, the restriction should not exceed 
necessary and reasonable limits to prevent such problems. The Court, thus narrowly 
limiting the discretion ofprison authority, could manage touphold the constitutionality 
of the Prison Act. 
  The other situation ispresented in the Custom Bureau Inspection Case 56) As stated 
above, the Custom Standard Act prohibits he importation f materials which "disturb 
social morality," thus depriving the public of the right to receive certain information 
from abroad. Yet, the Court rejected the constitutional attack against this prohibition. 
54) The decision of September 16, 1988, Osaka High Court, Hanrei Jihou vol. 1305, at70; the decision of 
February 19,1990, Okayama District Court, Hanrei Times vol. 730, at 74; the decision of February 20,1990, 
Kyoto District Court, Hanrei Times vol. 737, at 97. 
55) The judgment of June 22, 1983, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshu vol. 37, no. 5, at 793. 
56) The judgment of Dec. 12, 1984, Supreme Court, Band bench, Minshu vol. 38, no. 12, at 1308.
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The Court construed the word "social morality" to mean sexual morality, thus limiting 
the coverage of prohibition to obscene materials. Since the publication of obscene 
materials can be prohibited, the Court could then conclude, its importation can also be 
constitutionally prohibited. 
6-3. Restrictions an the Right to Gather Information 
  There is no direct statutory restrictions an the right to gather information. Yet one 
example of such restriction can be found in the prohibition of advocacy of illegal 
disclosure of official secret by the public officials in Sec. 111 of the National Public 
Workers Act. In the Nishiyama Case,s) a newspaper reporter Nishiyama was 
prosecuted for asking his girlfriend, a public worker at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
to bring to him a secret document showing the negotiation process between Japan and 
the United States concerning the return of Okinawa and was charged with a violation 
of Sec. 111. He attacked his conviction as an infringement of his right to gather 
information protected by the Constitution. 
  Three questions were raised: first, whether the document involved the "official 
secret," second, whether the prohibition of advocacy of illegal disclosure of official 
secret can be applied to newspaper reporter, and third, whether it is constitutional to 
punish newspaper reporter for his news-gathering activity. 
  "To decide whether the information falls within 'official secret' protected by the 
National Public Workers Act," the Court First held, "the court should look not only 
whether the information is formally classified but also whether its substance is worth 
for protection." And it ultimately held that the document involved was "official 
secret." The Court then held that the prohibition an advocacy of illegal disclosure of 
official secret could be applied to news-gathering activity of a reporter. The Court 
acknowledged that such an activity should be accorded ample respect in light of the 
underlying spirit of Art. 21. lt thus accorded immunity to a reporter "if his activity was 
conducted for reporting purpose and its method was permissible in light of the 
prevailing social consciousness viewed against the overall legal order." In this case, 
however, the defendant reporter approached his girlfriend solely for the purpose of 
obtaining the secret document and dumped her after he had received it. His conduct, 
the Court thus concluded, is against social consciousness and cannot be given im-
munity. 
57) The decision ofMay 31, 1978, Supreme Court, ist petty bench, Keishu vol. 32, no. 3, at 457.
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6-4. Threat to the Future Information Gathering Activity 
  Some governmental cts tend to have intimidating effects an future news-gathering 
activity even though they do not directly restrict news-gathering activity per se. 
  One such governmental ct is the forced disclosure of news sources. In the Ishii 
Case,58) the Court refused to acknowledge a newsmen's privilege from obligation to 
testify in the criminal trial. This decision was handed own when the Court did not 
know the right to gather information. It thus held that Art. 21 protected only the right 
to free speech and did not reach to news-gathering activities at all. 
  The second such governmental ct is a subpoena order against mass media. This 
issue was presented inthe Hakata Station TV Film Subpoena Case, discussed above.59) 
In this case, the Court acknowledged for the first time that the right of the TV stations 
to gather news should be given ample respect in light of the underlying spirit of Art. 
21. The Court then employed the ad hoc interest balancing test to decide the con-
stitutionality of the subpoena order and upheld it. 
  Third such case was presented in the Nippon TV Film Seizure Case.( '0) In 1989, 
Japan was swept with the so-called Recruit scandal. The Recruit Co., an information 
giant, sought o bribe the government officials and politicians. When an opposition 
Representative Narazaki tried to inquire about he scandal in the House, chief secretary 
of the company even tried to bribe him. Representative Narazaki invited the TV clues 
of the Nippon TV to his house and videotaped the scene of bribery. The Nippon TV 
broadcast some portions of the tapes. Thereafter Narazaki filed a criminal complaint. 
The Special Bureau of District Prosecutors' Office arrested the chief secretary for 
bribery and, in order to bolster its case against him, seized with the court warrant all 
original tapes the Nippon TV had videotaped, including unedited and unbroadcast 
portions. The Court rejected the appeal from the Nippon TV. It applied the same 
interest balancing test delineated in its Hakata Station TV Film Subpoena Case and 
held the seizure of videotapes involved constitutional. 
  The Court also applied the saureinterest balancing test to uphold seizure of 
videotapes by the police officers in the TBS Videotape Seizure Case.61) In this case, 
reporters of the TBS videotaped scenes of violent collections of debts by the gangsters 
and the police seized all videotapes as evidence for criminal prosecution. The Court 
admitted the importance of these tapes as evidence and discounted the possible threat 
58) The judgment of August 6,1952, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 6, no. 8, at 974. 
59) The decision f Nov. 26, 1969, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 23, no. 11, at 1490. 
60) The decision f Jan. 30, 1989, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Keishu vol. 43 no. 1, at 19. 
61) The decision f July 10, 1990, Supreme Court. 2nd petty bench, Asahisinbun July 10, 1990.
40 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 38:13 
to future news-gathering activities of the media reporters by emphasizing the fact the 
reporters intentionally continued to videotape the scene of violence with the consent 
of gangsters. 
6-5. The Right to Demand Disclosure of Governmental Information 
  Even though Zeading commentators acknowledge the right of the public to demand 
disclosure of governmental information, no Freedom of Information Act is enacted 
thus far. Yet an increasing number of municipalities has enacted Freedom of Informa-
tion Ordinances and guarantees to its residents the right to demand disclosure of 
administrative information of each municipality. 
  In absence of such statute or ordinance, itis generally thought that the public cannot 
file a suit demanding the Government to disclose specific information. This does not 
apply, however, when the Constitution itself obliges the Government to disclose its 
information. 
  One such example is an obligation to open trial imposed by Art. 82 of the Constitu-
tion. Since open trial is constitutionally mandated, one should be allowed to file a suit 
under Article 21 if the court closes the courtroorn or otherwise restricts access. That 
obligation, however, does not forte the presiding judge, as the Court held in the Hokkai 
Times Case,62) to allow utterly free photographing in the courtroom. If the reporter 
disturbed the order of the courtroorn i  attempt to take picture of the defendant ignoring 
the judge's instruction, the Court concluded, the presiding judge could punish him. 
  When a presiding judge refused to allow the public to take note inside the 
courtroom, however, the Court showed a different attitude. In the Courroom Note-
Taking Case,63) the Court acknowledged that note-taking in the courtroorn should be 
accorded ample respect in light of the underlying spirit of Art. 21 and held that no 
general permit system should be established. It would be thus reasonable to require 
advance permit and deny permit only when there is specific likelihood that fair and 
efficient management of the court proceedings become unmaintainable. 
6-6. The Right of Access to Mass Media 
  It is important for the ordinary public to receive various information. But as mass 
media have come to be highly concentrated, it has become xtremely difficult for the 
ordinary public to get access to mass media. The public is deprived of any meaningful 
opportunity to speak before the audience. Free marketplace of ideas, so essential as a 
62) The judgment of Feb. 17, 1958, Supreme Court, grand bench, Keishu vol. 12, no. 2, at 253. 
63) The judgment of March 8, 1989, Supreme Court, grand bench, Minshu vol. 43, no. 2, at 89.
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foundation for free speech, then becomes merely a myth. Against this background, 
some people have come to assert he right of access to mass media. 
  The Court first confronted this issue in the Sankei Newspaper Case.64) In this case, 
the Sankei Newspaper published an opinion ad prepared by the Liberal Democratic 
Party which criticized and ridiculed the Japan Communist Party's policy. The Japan 
Communist Party then requested the Paper to provide free space for rejoinder and, 
when its request was denied, filed a suit alleging the infringement of its right of free 
speech guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court rejected the suit, however, since the 
Sankei Newspaper is a private enterprise and is not subject o constitutional restric-
tlon 65) 
                   CONCLUSION 
  Is freedom of expression sufficiently protected in Japan? This is a hard question 
and answer will naturally differ depending upon one's standpoint. As I have examined 
in this paper, freedom of expression isseverely regulated by statutes and the Court has 
constantly upheld these regulations. No Court decision has ever invalidated any statute 
restricting freedom of expression. Some commentators notwithstanding,66) 1 myself 
cannot say therefore that freedom of expression is sufficiently protected against he 
governmental infringement in Japan. 7) 
  Turning our eyes from governmental restrictions to restrictions in private life, 
freedom of expression is threatened by private infringements as well as more subtle 
intimidation in many respects. Moreover, incidents of self-censorship n mass media 
are not rare. Japanese mass media often lacks appreciation of the significance of 
freedom of expression. And even terrorism against he press is not so unusual. It is 
still fresh in memory of many that Mayor Motoshima of the Nagasaki City who said 
in public that the last Emperor bore responsibility for the World War II was shot and 
wounded by a right-wing terrorist. It seems to be a far cry from Situation where 
everyone is free to say whatever he or she believes. And the Diet and public authorities 
have been reluctant o protect such freedom of expression against private infringe-
ments. 
64) The judgment of April 24, 1987, Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, Minshu vol. 41, no. 3, at 490. 
65) Since the Court found the Sankei Newspaper not liabie for defamation, it refused to ecide whether the ight 
of reply can be inferred from the Civil Law. 
66) See, e.g., L. Beer, supra note 1. 
67) See also Kamiya, Freedom of Expression, in Kyoto American Studies Summer Seminar Specialists 
Conference 91 (1987)
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  It is therefore an inescapable conclusion of this paper that the protection of freedom 
of expression is not still sufficient in Japan. Not sufficient, for now. And it is sincerely 
hoped that the Court will give due respect to freedom of expression in the future.
